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For coun~ahlc-stale decision processes (dynamic programming problems). a general class of 
objective functions is identified for which it is shown that good blarkov strategies alway exist. 
This cl;~cs includes product and lim inf rewards, as well as prxtic;dly all the classical dynamic 
programming expected pnyolf function.\. 
I. Introduction 
A fundamental question in the theory of decision processes is whether decision 
rules (strategies) which depend only on the current state or only on the current time 
and state yield as high rewards as strategies which take the whole past into account. 
For many types of objective functions such as average reward payolls, the first type 
of strategy (called sfufionary) is often much inferior to more general strategies, 
whereas for most common objective functions the second type (called Markoo 
strategies) have been found to be as good as general strategies (cf. [I, 3, 5, 7, 8, IO, 
II, 13, 14, 17, 211). 
The main purpose of this paper is to prove the existence of good Markov strategies 
for a large class of objective functions which includes product and lim inf payoffs 
as well as practically all of the classical dynamic programming expected payoff 
functions. One of the key new ideas is the use of a randomized Markov strategy 
which depends not only on a given non-randomized strategy, but on the (product) 
reward function as well, in contrast to the usual randomized Markov average which 
depends only on the original strategy [7, 8, 11, 14, 191. 
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This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains the preliminary definitions 
and averaging results; Section 3 contains the definition of product-reward dependent 
randomized Markov strategies, and their application in establishing the existence 
of good randomized Markov strategies in a large class of objective functions W; 
Section 4 establishes the existence of good non-randomized Markov strategies in 
74”; and Section 5 establishes the existence of good (non-randomized) Markov 
strategies for the expected lim inf reward criterion. 
2. Countable-state decision processes and randomized strategies 
A countable-slate decision process is a pair (X, f ), where X is a countable set and 
I’ associates to each point x in X a non-empty collection f(x) of probability 
measures on X. (In classical dynamic programming terminology, X represents the 
state space and f-(.x) the actions available at x; in the gambling theory terminology 
of Dubins and Savage [6] (upon which most of the notation used in this paper is 
based), (X, I‘) is simply a gambling house with a countable number of fortunes and 
countably-additive gambles). A srraregy is a function from the finite sequences in 
X (including the empty sequence “fl”) to the probability measures on X, and the 
same symbol, rr, will be used to denote both a strategy and the probability measure 
it generates on the Bore1 product sigma-algebra 3” on X” (X endowed with the 
discrete topology). A srrcrreg_r v in I‘ at x is a strategy such that (r(M) E I’(x) and 
fT( .V, , . . . , Y ) E /‘(s,,) for all ,r,, . . ,l . , x,, E X and all n 2 1. A strategy u is Marliou 
[IO] if cr(.~, . . . , x,,) = u(x;, . . , , x1,) whenever XL = x,, and is sfutionrmy if 
U( I, l . . . , x,,) = ~T(I’,. . . , x:,) whenever XI,, = x,,. The conditionnl strategv given 
x, , . . . , x,,, u[.q , . . . , .\-“], is defined by 
o[x,, . . . ) x,1(.x;. . . . ,x:,,) = U(X,, . . . (X,, x;, . . . , xi,,). 
X,, denotes the state of the process at time n and can be regarded as the 
nth-coordinate projection map on X’“‘. Thus X, is a random variable on the 
probability space (X“, %9x’, u). In addition, S(x) denotes the Dirac delta measure 
at x, and I,, the indicator function of the set A. 
Definition 2.1. The discrete randomized closure off-, I?, is the function 
,{, p,y,: Y,E I’(X),P,‘O, ; PI = 1 . 
I-;1 
Thus I? 2 f’, and in general the gambler has more strategies available in f’ than 
in f-, namely the “randomized averages” of his originally available strategies. One 
may think of constructing a strategy in f’ by use of independent lotteries: when one 
is at state x, he may select the lottery (i.e. the {p,}) of his choice, and use that lottery 
to determine which gamble in f(x) he selects (see the proof of Proposition 2.2). 
Clearly F(.Y) is convex for all x, and in general is strictly larger than the convex 
hull of I’(.r). 
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The first proposition in this section says that every Markov strategy 6 in f may 
be expressed as an average (expected value) of Markov strategies in I-. Aside from 
some notational differences, the proposition is similar to theorems of Krylov [ 14, 
Theorem I] and Fainberg [7, Theorem 11. Because of the changes in notation, a 
proof is provided here. 
Proposition 2.2. Let 6 be a srrateg)t in ? at x. 7len there exists a probabi1it.v triple 
(0, SJ, IL) and a collection of strategies {a,: w E 0) in rat x satislsing 
c?(B)= cr,(B)dp(W) forall Bin SIA”. 
I 
(2.1) 
Moreover, if 6 is a Markov strategy, then {o;. . w E l2) can be chosen to be Markov. 
Proof. The argument will be provided for the case where G is Markov; the demonstra- 
tion in the non-Markov case is essentially the same. Fix a Markov strategy C? in r? 
at .y, and without loss of generality let X = { 1.23,. . .}. Enlarging the underlying 
probability space if necessary, embed the “state process” X = (X,, X2, X,, . . .) in 
a larger process (X,, Y,, X1. Y:, . . .) where: the conditional distribution of Y, given 
X,, Y,, . . . , Y,_,, X, is uniform on [0, I) (so the {Y,} are i.i.d. uniform [0, I), and 
Y, is independent of X,, . . . , X,); and the conditional distribution of X,, , given 
X,. Y,,.... X,, Y, is Y,.~.~ on the set 
IX, =j]n{YE[a,.,., .,. n,.,.k)I. 
where x;‘.,p ,.,. Ay ,.,. L is the gamble in I’ which ci uses if in state j at time i, and 
a {./.A = PI. 1. I +. . . + PI.1.h. 
(Recall that both P,,,.~ > 0 and y,.,.& E r’(j) for all i, j, k.) Observe that the distribution 
of X in the embedded process is the same as the distribution of X under the strategy 
6, that is, P(X E B) = G(B) for all 11 E 9’. Since the random vectors X and 
Y=(Y,, Yz,.. .) take values in Bore1 spaces, it follows [2, Theorem 4.341 that there 
exists a regular conditional distribution for X given Y. That is, there is a function 
U, .,( .) on [0, 1)“~ %“such that for fixed w E [0, I)‘, CT,(*) is a probability measure 
on (X O, 53 ‘), and for fixed BE 93 II, u(, ,( B) is a version of P(X E B 1 Y). Moreover, 
for each w there is a natural Markov strategy cr, in I’ at .K associated with the 
measureu,;ifw=(r,,r,,.. .) then u,., is the strategy which in state j at time i uses 
y ‘.I. kE f’(j), where k is determined by a ,.,. k-I s r, <a ,,,, A. Let fi be [0, I)‘, .A the 
product-Bore1 sigma algebra, and p the product of countably many copies of 
Lebesgue measure on [0, 1). The conclusion (2.1) then follows, since 
&(B)=P(XeB)= P(XEBIY)~P,.= 
I 
u,(B)dp(W). 0 
In contrast to the conclusion of Proposition 2.2 pertaining to Markov strategies, 
it is not always possible to write a stafionary strategy in I? as the average of stationary 
strategies in I: 
Example 2.3. Let X ={a, b, c}; let f(a)={b(b), 6(c)}, and I‘(b)= f(c)=b(n). Let 
ci be the stationary strategy in f at b which uses (6(b)+ 6(c))/? always at state 
“a”, and let B = {X2 = b and X, = c}. Then 6(B) = f, but CJ( B) = 0 for all (i.e. both) 
stationary strategies (T in I- at b. 
Proposition 2.4. Let G be a strategy in P at x, and let f : X’-, R be measurable and 
G-integrable (i.e. j 1 f 1 dG < 00). Then there exist strategies cr, and u2 in r at x with 
Moreover, if‘ci is Markov, then u, and w2 can be chosen to be Markoc. 
Proof. By Proposition 2.2 there is a probability space (0, d, p) and a collection of 
(Markov) strategies {a,,} in I’ at I satisfying (2.1). It then follows routinely (for 
indicator functions, then for simple functions, then for limits of simple functions) 
using the dominated convergence theorem that 
Since p is a probability mcasurc, this even implies there is a set of w of positive 
p-measure for which J j’drr,, 3 J /‘dtr. [J 
An immediate corollary to Proposition 2.4 is that in decision processes with 
bounded payolls /; one may do just as well with non-randomized (pure) stratcgics 
as with randomized ones. 
Corollary 2.5. Let /’ : X” + Iw be bounded and measuruble. Then 
(i) sup /dir: u in 1’ at x f’d6: ci in r? at ,r , arrd 
(ii) inf f d(J: u in 1’ at x fd$: C? in I’ at x . 
Equality is not always attainable in the conclusion of Proposition 2.4, as the 
following easy example shows. 
Example 2.6. Let X = (a, b, c}; let f’(u) = {6(b), S(c)}, I’(b) = {S(b)}, and I’(c) = 
{6(c)}; and define f by f(.~, , x2,. . .) = 1 if x, = b, and = 0 otherwise. If 6 is the 
stationary strategy in 1’ at “a” given by C;(8) = (6(b) + S( c))/Z, then J/dG = i, but 
J/drr=O or 1 for all u in I: 
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3. Randomized Markov strategies 
Assume that (X, f) is a countable-state decision process. 
Definition 3.1. For each positive integer n, let r,, be a non-negative real-valued 
function with domain X and let Y,- be the collection of all strategies in lY Let U-, 
be the set of all functions w,:Y’, + [-CD, +CO] = fi which are of the form 
w,(g) = g(L[r,(X,)l, ET[r,(XJI,~ .. , E”[r”(x)I,. . .A 
and let ‘%“? be the set of all functions w2 : Yr + [ -cc, + a] of the form 
WV:(U) = g 
( 
Kr[r,(X,)I, ~u[~,(x,)~z(x2)I.~ * f , +i,+?,+). 
where g is any function having domain (R’)” and taking values in R. Let W, u Ua2 
be denoted by W. 
Thus ‘W, consists of those payoff functions which depend only on expected 
one-stage rewards, while W2 includes those payoffs which depend on successive 
expected product rewards. 
The following example lists some typical functions in ‘If; both some standard 
dynamic programming objectives and several non-standard ones. 
Example 3.2. (a) total reward. Then w c ‘W,, where 
W(U) = E,[ ,i, f”~X.)]. 
(In particular, if p > 0 and r,, = /3 “-‘r, then W(V) is “total discounted reward”; if 
r, = 0 for n 2 N, W(U) is “total finite horizon reward”.) 
(b) uverage reward. Then w E W,, where 
(c) exponential (product) reward. Then w E W,, where 
(d) supremum reward. Then w E W,, where 
w(a) = sup EJ”(X”). 
n 
(e) aoeruge periodic reward. Let p be a positive integer. Then w E W,, where 
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(In particular, if p = 1, then w(a) is “lim sup reward”.) 
(f) expected producf reward. Then w E W*2, where 
w(g) =liFTip E, ir r,(X,) . 
[ 3 /=I 
(In particular, if AC X and r, = I4 for each n, then H’(U) is the probability of 
staying in A forever.) 
(g) maximum deviation. If p is a constant. then w E U’, , where 
H’((~)=li~~_uplE.,[r,(X,)l-pl. 
(h) maximum variation (in expected performance). Then w E %‘, , where 
w(~)=sup 1 max E,,[r,(X,)]-min E,,[r,(X,)l. 
n 4 .V ,C” ,‘” 
Two objective functions which are not in ‘N’ are the classical gambling-theoretic 
payoff w(a) = E,.[limsup ,,_,.r(Xn)], and the product reward payoff W(U) = 
E,,[ r( X,) . r( X2) . r( X,)] for the case where r may take negative and positive values. 
The question of adequacy of Markov strategies for the gambling-theoretic payoff is 
answered aflirmatively, if X is finite. in Hill [IO]; for the product reward problem, 
Markov strategies are not in general adequate (Example 3.7 below). 
As preparation for the fundamental definition of product-dependent randomized 
Markov strategy. some notation is needed. For each positive integer n, let r,, : X + R 
hc a non-negative function and Ict (r be a strategy. Il’y = (.Y,, x2. . . . , s,) is a scqucnce 
(or parti~~l Irisfory) of length II in S. let f(tr, y) denote Ihc product 
r,(_Y,)rl(_Y~) ’ * * r,,(.lr,,)f’,,(.~,=.~,, x,=x, ,..., s,, =s,,). 
Thut is, 
Definition 3.3. The product-dependenr randornked Markov strcrteg! for the strategy 
u and the rewards r,. rl, r>,. . is the strategy ci constructed as follows: let C?(U) = 
~(0). and for each .Y in X. let c?(x) = u(_Y). For any partial history y of length n 
such that n > 1 and y,, = s,,, let 
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and 
G(q)=a(x,) if e(a,px,)=O for eachpEX”-‘. 
Notice that the transition probability (gamble) that C? uses at x, is a mixture of 
gambles that u uses at x,, weighted with respect to the products t(a,px,). The 
assumption that each r, is non-negative guarantees that G(q) Z= 0. In the case where 
t( a, px.) = 0 for each p E X”-‘, the definition of 6(q) is rather arbitrary; I was 
chosen for convenience to ensure that 6 is Markov and in !‘. 
Remark. In the special case where r, = 1 for each n, the strategy c? in Definition 
3.3 has the property that 
6(X,+, EGIX,=X)=~(X,+,EGIX,=X) (3.1) 
for each subset G of X, each positive integer n, and each x E X. Such a randomized 
Markov average 6 has been used often in the literature of dynamic programming. 
(For example, see Fainberg [7,8], or Strauch [ 191). 
The product-dependent randomized Markov strategy 6 yields the same product 
reward as the original strategy a, as seen below: 
Proposition 3.4. If (T is a slrategy, r, . X + R is a non-negative function for each n, 
and if ci is the product dependent randomized Ma&v strategy for v and r, , rz, rz, . . . , 
then for each positive integer n, 
(3.2) 
Proof. It follows from Definition 3.3 (since x,* sti I t((r, p?r,,) = 0 if and only if each 
summand is zero) that for all n 2 I, all x, E X, and all q~ X” such that 4” =x,, 
The plan is to show by induction that for all n z 2, 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
Then, evaluating each side of the measure equality (3.4) at (X,, = x,), multiplying 
both sides by r”(x,), and summing over all x, in X, the desired equality (3.2) will 
be obtained for all-n 2 2. 
To prove (3.4) for n = 2, observe that for each ?c in X, 
5(a, x) = r,(x)g((3)(I-y)) = r,(x)G(fl)(IxI) = ((6, x). 
For the induction step, calculate as follows: 
using (3.3) and observing that c?( p.r,) does not depend on p. Then, with aid of the 
induction hypothesis, 
and (3.4) is proved; the relation (3.2) follows, as long as n 2 2. For the case where 
n = I, (3.3) holds because C?(U) = a(O). Cl 
The following theorem, the main result in this section, guarantees the existence 
of good ranciomixf Markov strategies for all countable-state decision processes 
with objective function in ‘II.. It will also serve as a stepping stone to Theorem 4.2, 
which asserts the existence of good non-randomid Markov strategies for many of 
the objective functions in ‘II: 
Proof. Let .YC X and let (r be in I’ at .v. In case WE ‘I{‘,, let ti be the randomized 
Markov strategy described in the remark following Definition 3.3. The relation (3.1) 
guarantees that 
.fZ ,;[ r,, ( S,, ) 1 = &[ r,, (X,, )I (3.5) 
for each II 2 I, and hence that W(U) = H’(c?), proving the theorem. In case H’C ‘II’2, 
let 6 be the product-dependent randomized Markov strategy for (r and r, , rl, r,, . . . . 
The proof is completed by applying Proposition 3.4. 0 
Remarks. The portion of Theorem 3.5 which pertains to St’, is a special case of 
results of Derman and Strauch [5, Theorem 21 and of Hordijk [ 11, Theorem 13.2]. 
In Definition 3.1, each function r,, was assumed non-negative, and in the case 
where WE 7i’2, the proof of Theorem 3.5 did use this assumption. However, in the 
case where n,E ?I-, , the only purpose of the hypothesis r,, 2 0 was to guarantee the 
existence of each expectation E,,[ r,( X,)]. Thus for the W, case, the non-negativity 
assumption on r,, may be weakened. 
Actually, in the ?I*, case, the proof of Theorem 3.5 depended only upon the fact 
that the distrihtions of X, under (r and ci are the same, and not upon the integrals 
in (3.5). Therefore its conclusion would hold for a much larger class than ‘U”,, 
specifically, objective functions which depend only on the distributions of the 
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random variables, such as functions of the medians, supports, or variances. But for 
the application of this theorem in the proof of the existence of good non-randomized 
Markov strategies (Theorem 4.4), integration (via averages of probability measures 
and Fatou’s Lemma) plays an important role. 
The W, case of Theorem 3.5 could also be extended to reward functions of the 
form r-(X,,, X.+,), since the distribution of (X,, X,,,) is the same under u as under 
the 6 described in (3.1). Even further, the reward could depend on the gamble or 
action as well, with rewards of the form r,(X,, y, X,,,). Such reward functions 
have been investigated before (cf. Ornstein [ 151 or Schil and Sudderth [ 181). 
This section concludes with three examples of decision processes where the payoff 
functions are not in W, and where, in contrast to the setting of Theorem 3.5, there 
are non-Markov strategies in f which yield substantially larger payoffs than any 
Markov strategies in I? In the first example, the payoff is the expected maximum 
reward over times I, 2, and 3 (recall the rna.uhum expecfed reward 3.2(d) is in W). 
In the second example, the payoff is the product of rewards over times I, 2. and 3. 
but negative rewards are allowed. The third example shows that it is not possible 
to extend Theorem 3.5 to include payoff functions w which can be written as a sum 
of two payoffs, one from W, and one from WZ. 
Example 3.6. Let X = {a, h, c, d, e}; r, = rl=rl=r, where r(~z)=r(c)=r(d)=O, 
~(h)=5,~(e)=lO;f’(a)={~6(h)+~~S(~)},I’(h)=I’(c)=J‘(e)={~S(d)},andI‘(d)= 
{c?(b), ~1, where y=.:S(e)+:fi(a); and H*(U) = E,,[max{r(X,). r(X&, r(X>)}]. Let 
CT,., be any strategy in (’ at “u” which, when in state d at time 2, uses y if X, = h 
and uscs 6(h) if XI = C. (That is, cr,(h, d) = y and tr,.,(c, d) = 6(h)). It is easily 
verified that N(u,,) = y, while for any Mnrkov strategy (; in ? at “N”, w(,;) = 5. 
Example 3.7. Let X = {a, b, c, (I, e,/}, and r, = r2 = rJ = r, where r(u) = r(b) = r(d) = 
r(e)=+l, and r(c)=r(S)=-1. Let /‘(u)=($(b)+$(c)}, f’(b)=f’(c)=/‘(e)= 
l’(f) = {fi(d)}, and f‘(d) = {s(e), 6(f)}. Define the expected product reward objec- 
tive by )2*((r) = E,,[r(X,) * r(X2) * r(X,)] for UE 9’,,. If u,, is a strategy in I‘ at “u” 
such that u.,\(b, d) = S(e) and u~(c, d) = S(S), then w(u,,) = +I, but for any Markov 
strategy G in f’ at “a”, w(G) = 0. 
Example 3.8. Let (X, I’) be as in Example 3.6, let r, = rz = rJ = r, = r, where r(u) = 
r(c)=O,- r(b)=r(d)=l, r(e)=5, and let W(U) = E,,[ r(X,) . r( X2) * r( X,)] + 
E,,[r(X,)]. A calculation shows that for the non-Markov strategy g,, defined in 
Example 3.6, HV( u,,) = :, while for any Markov strategy 6 in 1’ at “(I”, H’(C)< 1.5. 
If the reward functions r,, are non-negative, then the expected product reward 
objective HP lies in ‘If’ (Example 3.2(J)), and by Theorem 3.5, good randomized 
Markov strategies do exist. It follows from Theorem 4.2 in the next section that 
even good non-randomized Markov strategies exist for such an objective. 
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Denardo and Rothblum [4] use linear programming to compute optimal policies 
for problems which have exponential utility functions and which satisfy certain 
transience conditions. In [12] and [ 131, Kreps studies the existence of optimal 
(non-Markov) strategies in problems with finite action spaces and general objective 
functions and the existence of good strategies which are Markov or stationary with 
respect to certain attached “summary spaces”. Furukawa and Iwamoto [9] prove 
the existence of E-optimal stationary strategies for decision problems which have 
multiplicative payoffs and which satisfy certain monotonicity and Lipschitz condi- 
tions. The multiplicative payoff is also used by Rothblum in [16]. 
As pointed out in [9], the multiplicative payoff often arises naturally in problems 
where the objective is to maximize system reliability in 
in series. 
a device with components 
4. Existence of good Markov strategies in f 
The previous section established that if the objective function w lies in W‘ then 
for any strategy there is a randomized Markov strategy with an equivalent payoff. 
In this section, Theorems 4. I and 4.2 demonstrate that for a large class of objective 
functions within tie, it is even possible to find a non-randomized Markov strategy 
whose payoh is at least as good as the payolf for the original strategy. For those 
objective functions in ‘IL’ which are in ‘W,, the conclusions of Theorems 4.1 and 
4.2 are similar to those of theorems of Fainberg [8, Section 41. It is assumed 
throughout that (S, I’) is a countable-state decision process. 
w(u) = f drr for some hottnded, meusurahle f: X“‘ -t [w, (4.1) 
then /br any strategy cr,, in I‘ at x there exist Markov strategies uM and CT’~ in 1’ at x 
such rhar w(u,,,) 3 w(cr,) 3 w(&). 
Proof. Suppose cr, is in I‘ at x and w E 71’: By Theorem 3.5, there is a randomized 
Markov strategy C? in p at x with w(G) = w(g,,). Using Proposition 2.4, there exists 
a Markov strategy u,$, in f‘ at x such that 
The ui, conclusion follows similarly. 0 
It was shown earlier (Theorem 3.5) that if w : Yip, + R is in ‘W’, then for any strategy 
g there is a randomized Markov strategy C? with w(G) = w(a). By imposing some 
convexity restrictions, the following key theorem is obtained, which asserts the 
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existence of good non-randomized Markov strategies. (Of course, by enlarging the 
state space sufficiently, any problem can be transformed into one where even good 
“stationary” strategies always exist, but the essence of “stationary” and “Markov” 
for the original problem is lost under the transformation.) 
Theorem 4.2. Suppose r, : X -, R’ are bounded and g, : (R’) + R 
and that w : 9’,- + [ -CO, a)) is defined by w = limsup G,. 4rere 
(i) G,(o) = g,(&[ri(X,)l,. . . , EArn(X, or 
are contex functions, 
(ii) G,(a) =g, ~%[r,(X,)l, &[r,(X,)n(Xdl,. . . , 
For each x E X, if 
sup{C,(a): n 2 1 and u is in f at x} <co, 
then for any strategy uA in r at x there is a (non-randomked) Markou strategy uhf 
in rat x such that 
4a,,,)s W(UA). 
Proof. Let v,, be in I’ at x. Ry Theorem 3.5, there is a randomized Markov strategy 
6 in I? at x such that w(G) = w(cr,,). Apply Proposition 2.2 to obtain a family {CT‘,) 
of Markov strategies in I’ at x such that for all n, 
E,;[r,tX.Jl = 1 [ 1 r,,(K) dn.] dcL(wJ 
and 
E.;[i”,r,(Xj)]=I[l~l,r,(X,)da..]dll(w). 
J 
Then by the convexity of g, and by Jensen’s inequality, it follows that 
for all n. Since sup,.,{ G,(cr,)} < cc, Fatou’s Lemma applies, and 
w(6) = limsup G,(6) s limsup 
,l-t(c “--I=? J 
s J liyyy G(u,) G(w) 
= 
J 
w(u..,) G(w). 
Since p is a probability measure, the relation above guarantees that there exists w 
(in fact, a set of w’s of positive measure) with 
H’(UU) > H’(6) = H’(U,,). 0 
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For x E X, let W(x) = sup{ W( (T): ~7 is in f at x}. A strategy mA in r at x is optimal 
if H’(qq) = W(x); for .s >O, uA is e-opfimal if “(a,)> W(x)-&. The following 
corollary is immediate. 
Corollary 4.3. lf the hypotheses of Theorem 4.2 are satisfied, then for each E > 0 and 
x E X, there is a Markov e-optimal strategy in rat x. If also there is an optimal strategy 
in r at x, then there e.xists a Markov optimal strategy in r at x. 
Remarks. If one replaces “limsup” by “sup” in the definition of w in Theorem 4.2, 
the conclusion still holds; to see this, let h, = max,,, g,, and observe that the h, are 
convex and that limsup h, = lim h, = sup g,. 
The convexity assumption in Theorem 4.2 is not as restrictive as it might seem 
at first glance; observe that all the payoffs in Example 3.2 except (f) are of this 
form (in fact, in (a), (b). (d), and (e), the g, are even linear). 
If the functions g, in the statement of Theorem 4.2 are not convex, there may be 
no Markov strategy u,,, for which w((T,,,) 3 w((T~,). Indeed, ~(a,,) could be strictly 
larger than the supremum of H’(v&,) over Markov strategies on, available at .r, as 
the next example illustrates. 
Example 4.4. Let X = {o, h, c, d, e, f } and r,, = r for each n, where r(e) = I and r = 0 
otherwise. Let I’(a)={IS(h)+~iS(c)}, /‘(b)=l‘(c)=/‘(e)=f‘(f)={6(d)}, and 
I’(d) =(6(c), S(f)}. Define w on IP,. by 
( 
I 
w(w) = 
if E,,[r(X,)]=i, 
0 othcrwisc. 
In the notation of Theorem 4.2, the function g,, :R” +R (n > 3) is defined by 
g,,(?,,9...,y,1)= 
( 
1 ify,=l, 
0 otherwise. 
Notice that g,, is not convex, and that if u ,, is a strategy in f’ at a which. satisfies 
u,(b, d)= (j(e) and u,,(c, d) = 6(j’), then w(u,,)= 1. However, for any Markov 
strategy oh, in I’ at a, EC,,, (X,) = I or 0, so w(u~,) = 0. (Of course, as Theorem 3.5 
implies, there does exist a mndomked Markov strategy ci in 1’ at a such that 
H’(C) = 1.) 
Practically no condition, including the convexity of the g,‘s, is necessary for the 
conclusion of Theorem 4.2 to hold, as can be seen by looking at any decision process 
where I’(x) has only one element for each x (so there is only one strategy, and that 
is even stationary) and an arbitrary payofI function. 
5. Good Markov strategies for the lim inf objective 
The results of the earlier sections will now be used to show that for the expected 
lim inf payofT, it is possible to find Markov strategies which are nearly optimal. 
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In the classical gambler’s problem of Dubins and Savage [6], applied to the 
special case of a countable-state decision process, the payoff associated with a 
strategy is 
EJlimsup u(X”)], n-x 
where u : X -, R, the utility function, is bounded. 
Sudderth [20], working from the Dubins and Savage framework, investigated the 
analogous payoff 
E,,[lit$f u(X)1 
and established sufficient conditions for the existence of good stationary strategies 
under such a payoff. In particular, he showed that if the state space X is finite and 
f(x) is finite for each XE X, then optimal stationary strategies exist. In a general 
countable-state decision problem, however, good stationary strategies need not exist 
for the expected lim inf objective, as can be seen by examining Example 3.9.2 of 
[6]. It is proved below that by allowing Markoo strategies instead of only stntionnry 
ones, near-optimality can be achieved. 
Let (X, I’) be a countable-state decision process and let u: X + R be bounded. 
Define W: X +R by 
W(x) =sup(E.,[liminf u(X,)]: u is a strategy in I’ at s). 
,I * r- 
E ,,,,, [li,;;iff u( X,,)] > W(x) - F. 
Proof. The theorem is easily reduced to the case where u is non-negative and takes 
only finitely many values. Next, let x E X, E > 0, and u have values c, < c2 < * * . < q. 
Let 6 be E or 
min{c,,,-c,: lSjCl-l), 
whichever is smaller. Let r~ be a strategy in I‘ at x such that 
E,[liF_i;fu(X,)]> W(x)-$. 
I 
(5.1) 
According to Lemma 1 of Sudderth [20], W(x), W(X,), W(Xz), . . . is a super- 
martingale which converges rr-almost surely, 
a[liminf u(X,,) > li”m_izf W(X,)] = 0, (5.2) 
n _-ix 
and 
W(x) 3 E,,[liF__i,“f W(X,)] 2 E,,[linm_i,“f u(X,)]. (5.3) 
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Use relations (5.1) and (5.3) to obtain 
E,[linm_isnf W(X.)-lim%fu(X.)]<-$-. 
1 
Then by (5.2). (5.4), and Markov’s inequality, 
u 
I 
liminf W(X.)-liminfu(X.)<i 
n-X1 “-.S 1 >l-2. I 
(5.4) 
(5.5) 
For each m 2 1. let 
D, = inf u(X,)=liminf u(X,) and sup] W(X,)-liminf u(X,)l<: 
,=m n-u) jrm "-Lx I 
From (5.5), the almost-sure convergence of W(x), W(X,), W(X,). . . . , and the 
assumption that u takes only finitely many values, there exists a positive integer N 
such that 
V(D+l-;. 
I 
For each k, I Q k C /, Ict 
AL= xcX: u(s)ack and c,-P, W(.r)<c,+~ 
t 
and 
B,” = {(x,, x2,. . .) E X”‘: for all n Z= N, x, E Ak}. 
Notice that the sets { fl,“} are disjoint and that 
(5.7) 
For each positive integer k, let 6, be the product-dependent randomized Markov 
(5.6) 
strategy for u and the rewards fI.kr r2,k, r,,k, . . . , where each rj.k : X -*R is defined by 
1 1 . for j< N, r).k = I ,,k for j> N. (5.8) 
Now define the randomized Markov strategy G in I? at .r as follows: if ~7 is a 
partial history of length less than N, let 
and observe that for such ~7 and for all j, 6,(q) = c?,(q). Further, if q is a partial 
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history of length m, where m 2 N, let 
(k(q) ifq,EAk, 
84) = 
G,(q) if %t.X\( ), A,). 
(The definition of G(q) above is quite arbitrary in the case where qm does not lie 
in any of the sets A,.) With aid of (5.8) and Proposition 3.4, 
= E<r[ i!T, q.dX,)] = u(Bt’) 
for each k 2 I. Then calculate: 
E,;[lizi:f u( X,,)] 2 t 
1 I 
k=l tly 
Iir_i;f tr(X,) dG2 1 c,(;( Br) 2 2 cLa(Br) 
h=I k=I 
liminf W( X,) d<T -? 
,,; n-‘- 3 
2 E,,[liminf K’( X,,)] -7, W(x) - F. 
,1 . . 
(The next-to-last inequality used (5.6) and (5.7), and the last inequality used (5.1) 
and (5.3).) 
Finally, use the above scquencc of inequalities together with Proposition 2.4 to 
obtain a (non-randomized) Markov strategy u nr in I’ at .‘c which satislics the desired 
relation. cl 
If the state space X is finite, the conclusion of Theorem 5.1 is a special case of 
a result of Hill [IO], who showed that if the functionj’in (4.1) is both shift-invariant 
and permutation-invariant, then good Markov strategies exist. 
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